Bootleggers and Baptists
Bootleggers and Baptists is a catch-phrase invented by regulatory economist Bruce Yandle[1] for the observation that regulations are supported by both groups that want the ostensible purpose of the regulation and groups that profit from undermining that purpose.[2]
For much of the 20th century, Baptists and other evangelical Christians were prominent in political activism for Sunday closing laws restricting the sale of alcohol. Bootleggers sold alcohol illegally, and got more business if legal sales were restricted.[1] “Such a coalition makes it easier for politicians to favor both groups. … [T]he Baptists lower the costs of favor-seeking for the bootleggers, because politicians can pose as being motivated purely by the public interest even while they promote the interests of well-funded businesses. … [Baptists] take the moral high ground, while the bootleggers persuade the politicians quietly, behind closed doors.”[3]
Contents
Economic theory
The mainstream economic theory of regulation treats politicians and administrators as brokers among interest groups.[4][5] Bootleggers and Baptists is a specific idea in the subfield of regulatory economics that attempts to predict which interest groups will succeed in obtaining rules they favor. It holds that coalitions of opposing interests that can agree on a common rule will be more successful than one-sided groups.[6]
Baptists do not merely agitate for legislation, they help monitor and enforce it (a law against Sunday alcohol sales without significant public support would likely be ignored, or be evaded through bribery of enforcement officers). Thus bootleggers and Baptists is not just an academic restatement of the common political accusation that shadowy for-profit interests are hiding behind public-interest groups to fund deceptive legislation. It is a rational theory[7] to explain relative success among types of coalitions.[1][8][9]
Another part of the theory is that bootleggers and Baptists produce suboptimal legislation.[10] Although both groups are satisfied with the outcome, broader society would be better off either with no legislation or different legislation.[11] For example, a surtax on Sunday alcohol sales could reduce Sunday alcohol consumption as much as making it illegal. Instead of enriching bootleggers and imposing policing costs, the surtax could raise money to be spent on, say, property tax exemptions for churches and alcoholism treatment programs. Moreover, such a program could be balanced to reflect the religious beliefs and drinking habits of everyone, not just certain groups. But the surtax is less help to the bootleggers, and not only does not accomplish the main objective of the Baptists, it actually puts the government in league with Satan. From the religious point of the view, the bootleggers have not been cut out of the deal, the government has become the bootlegger.[3]
Although the bootleggers and Baptists story has become a standard idea in regulatory economics,[12] it has not been systematically validated as an empirical proposition. It is a catch-phrase useful in analyzing regulatory coalitions rather than an accepted principle of economics.[13]
Global warming
Legislation and treaties to reduce global warming often command support of both polluters and environmentalists. While there are several possible interpretations of that (for example, polluters could be trying to forestall stronger legislation, or to involve themselves in the process to insert specific protections; environmentalists could be unaware of industry support or fooled by it) it has been held up as an example of bootleggers and Baptists. In this version of the story, the polluters are looking for taxes and regulations to reduce competition, hoping to gain more from ability to charge higher prices than it costs them to pay taxes and comply with regulations. Environmentalists don’t care that some users of carbon are paying more money to some carbon emitters, as long as total carbon emissions go down and society takes a public stance in favor of the environment.[3]
Literal example
"Arkansas liquor stores have allied with religious leaders to fight statewide legalization of alcohol sales. The stores in wet counties don’t want to lose customers. The churches don’t want to lose souls. Larry Page, a Southern Baptist pastor and director of the Arkansas Faith and Ethics Council, which traces its roots to the Anti-Saloon League of Arkansas in 1899, [also recalled]. . .when his group joined with feminists to oppose pornography and cooperated with Mississippi casinos to fight gambling in Arkansas."[14]
Other applications
Bootleggers and Baptists have been invoked to explain nearly every political alliance for regulation in the United States in the last 30 years including the Clear Air Act,[15] interstate trucking,[16] state liquor stores,[17] the Pure Food and Drug Act,[18] environmental policy,[19] regulation of genetically modified organisms,[20] the North American Free Trade Agreement,[21] environmental politics,[22] gambling legislation,[23] blood donation,[24] wine regulation,[25] and the tobacco settlement.[26]
There are economists who regard bootleggers and Baptists as a libertarian catch phrase against all regulation rather than a serious piece of regulatory economics theory.[27] Not all of these examples are rigorous rational explanations. For example, many[who?] do not consider why the bootleggers form genuine alliances with real Baptists rather than fooling or funding a front group. Other analyses[who?] merely describe the successful coalition without considering why it formed instead of possible alternative coalitions.
See also
References
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Bruce Yandle, "Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist." Regulation 7, no. 3 (1983): 12.
- ↑ McChesney, Fred S. 1997. Money for Nothing: Politicians, Rent Extraction, and Political Extortion. Cambridge, U.K.: Harvard University Press.
- ↑ 3.0 3.1 3.2 Lua error in package.lua at line 80: module 'strict' not found.
- ↑ Baldwin, Robert, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, “The Oxford Handbook of Regulation”, Oxford University Press, 2012, 978-0199655885.
- ↑ Lasswell, Harold. [1936] 1990. Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How? New York: McGraw-Hill.
- ↑ Kahn, Alfred E., “The Economics of Regulation”, The MIT Press, 1988, 978-0262610523.
- ↑ Bryner, Gary C. 1987. Bureaucratic Discretion: Law and Policy in Federal Regulatory Agencies. New York: Pergamon Press.
- ↑ Tullock, Gordon. 1980. Rent Seeking as a Negative Sum Game. In Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, edited by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, 16–38. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.
- ↑ Wagner, Richard E. 1966. Pressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs: A Review Article. Review of The Logic of Collective Action, by Mancur Olson. Papers on Non-market Decision Making 1: 161–70.
- ↑ Buchanan, James M. 1980. Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking. In Toward a Theory of the Rent-Seeking Society, edited by James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, and Gordon Tullock, 3–15. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press.
- ↑ Sutter, Daniel. 2002. "The Democratic Efficiency Debate and Definitions of Political Equilibrium". Review of Austrian Economics 15, 2/3: 199–209.
- ↑ Schneider, Mark, and Paul Teske. 1992. Toward a Theory of the Political Entrepreneur: Evidence from Local Government. American Political Science Review 86, no. 3: 737–47.
- ↑ Breyer, Stephen, “Regulation and Its Reform”, Harvard University Press, 1984, 978-0674753761.
- ↑ Esmé E. Deprez and Millie Hogue. Oct 27, 2014. Arkansas Liquor Stores Join Churches to Save Dry Counties. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-10-27/arkansas-liquor-stores-join-churches-to-save-dry-counties.html.
- ↑ Ackerman, Bruce A., and William T. Hassler. 1981. Clean Coal/Dirty Air, or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-out for High-Sulfur Coal Producers and What Should Be Done about It. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- ↑ Benson, Bruce L. 2002. "Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking." Review of Austrian Economics 15, nos. 2–3: 229–55.
- ↑ Benson, Bruce L., David W. Rasmussen, and Paul R. Zimmerman. 2003. Implicit Taxes Collected by State Liquor Monopolies. Public Choice 115, nos. 3–4: 313–31.
- ↑ High, Jack, and Clayton A. Coppin. 1988. "Wiley and the Whiskey Industry: Strategic Behavior in the Passage of the Pure Food Act". Business History Review 62, no. 2: 286–309.
- ↑ Lyons, Michael. 1999. Political Self Interest and U.S. Environmental Policy. Natural Resources Journal 39, 2: 271–94.
- ↑ Meins, Erika. 2003. Politics and Public Outrage: Explaining Transatlantic and Intra-European Diversity of Regulations on Food Irradiation and Genetically Modified Food. Munster, Germany: Lit.
- ↑ Reynolds, Alan. 1993. The Politics of NAFTA. National Review 45, 20: 42–43.
- ↑ Rosenbaum, Walter A. 1995. Environmental Politics and Policy. 3rd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ-Roll Call Group Books.
- ↑ Schmidt, Susan. 2005. Casino Bid Prompted High-Stakes Lobbying. Washington Post, March 13. Available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A30274-2005Mar12.html.
- ↑ Thomas, Diana W., and Michael D. Thomas. 2010. Efficient Regulation? The Case of the Market for Blood. Working paper. Logan: Utah State University, Department of Economics and Finance.
- ↑ Wiseman, Alan. E., and Jerry Ellig. 2007. The Politics of Wine: Trade Barriers, Interest Groups, and the Commerce Class. Journal of Politics 69: 859–75.
- ↑ Yandle, Bruce, Joseph A. Rotondi, Andrew P. Morriss, and Andrew Dorchak. 2007. Bootleggers, Baptists, and Televangelists: Regulating Tobacco by Litigation. University of Illinois Law Review 82: 1225–84.
- ↑ Holcombe, Randall. 2002. "Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources." Review of Austrian Economics 15, 2/3: 143–59.
