KN-11

KN-11 Polaris
Type	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
Place of origin	North Korea , USSR Russia
Service history
Used by	North Korea
Production history
Manufacturer	North Korea
Specifications
Warhead	nuclear
Engine	Solid
Propellant	Unknown
Operational range	Not determined. Currently, at least 30km.
Launch platform	Sinpo-class submarine

The KN-11 (chosongul 북극성1호 (or 북극성 , Hwasong-10 화성10호 ) hanzhi 北極星1号 ) or Polaris-1 North Star Pukkuksong-1 or Bukgeukseong-1 or Nodong-D is a new North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) that is under development, based on the Soviet Russian R-27 and other projects on R-29, R-29RM. There are conflicting reports over the current stage of development.

According to a KBS World Radio report, on 23 January 2015 US military officials spotted a flight test of such missile on a sea-based platform. This test came shortly after the North Korea a test from static launcher on land platform in November 2014. Since the test is not conducted on a submarine directly, the US officials believed that this missile is still in its early stage of development.

The Korea Herald reported that South Korean government officials responded that the report was incorrect, saying "The reports on a flight test of the SLBM were different from the truth. It was a test of a vertical launcher, not a flight test".

Washington Free Beacon reported that North Korea conducted a third test with the missile on an underwater test platform on 22 April 2015 near the country's coastal city of Sinpo and that previous tests of the KN-11 missile were conducted in January 23 and in October 2014. South Korean officials later stated it was an "ejection test" to evaluate ejecting a submerged ballistic missile rather than a full test of a new missile system, and that the test missile seemed to have been launched from a submerged barge rather than a submarine.

Since information available is scarce, further technical details such as estimated range and payload, are yet to be determined.

Tests

On 9 May 2015, it was reported by North Korea's state run television that it has successfully tested a submarine launched ballistic missile without providing much details such as place of test, time of test, as well as technical details such as the missile name and its range. The information it provided is a pictures and videos showing that Kim Jong Un was watching the test with a missile fired from a submarine with the name Bukkeukseong-1 or Polaris-1 inscribed on the missile body. U.S. and South Korean officials pointed out that the missile was fired from an underwater barge rather than a submarine, and that it flew only 100 meters above the water.

In late November 2015, a second test of the KN-11 was conducted, which apparently failed. Reportedly, the missile was fired from an Sinpo-class submarine and did not successfully eject, resulting in damage to the conning tower of the submarine. The following month, satellite photos of a shipyard at the east coast site of Sinpo suggested that the submarine used in the test remains seaworthy and that development and testing activity of the SLBM may continue. The imagery also showed construction of facilities that could accommodate the building of larger submarines. A subsequent, successful injection was reported on 21 December 2015 with a video showing Kim Jong Un in attendance. Further analysis of the published video suggested that while the missile was successfully ejected from the launch tube, it exploded upon ignition. North Korea released footage of the launch in January 2016, which South Korea claimed was manipulated to show a successful test that didn't occur. This third test was from a submerged barge, likely so as not to risk damaging the launch submarine again. Video showed the 10-ton missile firing directly vertical out of the water, unlike the first test that emerged at a distinct angle. The first stage of the engine ignited, but the rest of the footage was inconsistently spliced together to appear it continued flying.

23 April 2016 Test

On 23 April 2016, Seoul have noticed that North Korea have conducted another round of SLBM test. The test was reported to be a success in achieving "Cold Launch" technology and able to ignite the rocket engine only after the missile was ejected from a submarine to a certain height. However, the missile flew only for a few minutes and estimated the missile to have flown for about 30km instead. The missile range fell short of expected 300km range as the minimum SLBM range.

The report was quickly republished in various medias worldwide.

North Korea has later claimed success from this test, citing the fact that "the missile was launched from its maximum underwater depth, and that its "cold launch" ejection mechanism and high performance engine using solid fuel worked without a hitch, along with its flight controls and warhead release systems."

Strategic implications

The KN-11 is the first sign of a North Korean sea-based nuclear deterrent, which complicates the U.S. and South Korean ability to preemptively destroy the country's nuclear capabilities by threatening a second strike. While there is a chance to take out land-based nuclear sites, ballistic missile submarines ensure that a retaliatory strike could still be launched before it can be found and neutralized. North Korea's unique circumstances limit the ways such a capability could be employed. The Korean People's Navy has no nuclear submarines, and no diesel-electric submarines equipped with air independent propulsion (AIP), so the launch submarine's range (and by extension the missile's) is limited and assuredly prevents it from threatening America's western seaboard. Given their submarines' insufficient power to outrun U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and lack of aerial and surface coverage to protect them out to long distances, they cannot venture far out to sea, although a scenario where a missile-equipped sub travels into the Sea of Japan on a "suicide mission" to fire the KN-11 before it expects to inevitably get destroyed is not implausible given the loyalty of the elite crewmen of the submarine force. A more likely scenario would be to deploy along the Korean coastline within its local air and surface cover to silently creep into or out of various hiding spots like bays, inlets, and outer isles before reaching its pre-designated position to stay quietly submerged by running on batteries; because of its finite power capacity, the sub would have to surface or snorkel for air to recharge its batteries if it remains hiding for an extended period, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare (ASW) efforts. The KN-11 likely won't be operational in even a limited capability until after 2020.

See also

• Korean People's Navy
• R-27 Zyb
• BM25 Musudan
• List of missiles